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ABSTRACT 
 
Women Labor Market Participation in Europe: 
Novel Evidence on Trends and Shaping Factors 
 
We investigate the changes in women’s participation patterns across 15 EU countries over 
the last 20 years using individual data from ECHP and EUSILC databases. Our findings 
reveal a role of social policies and institutional factors that is stronger than what has so far 
been assessed. Labor market reforms explain almost 25% of the actual increase in labor 
force participation for young women, and more than 30% for highly educated women. The 
effects of labor market reforms on the participation of low skilled women in the labor force are 
instead surprisingly small. We also find that reforms of the institutional framework towards a 
model of flexicure labor market are effective in enhancing women labor supply only when 
deregulation is accompanied by sufficient social compensation. 
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1 Introduction
The importance given to the protection of Human Rights and fundamental freedoms in the European
Community Treaties has changed considerably since the European venture was rst launched. Since
1975 a series of directives have broadened the principle of equality between men and women to cover
working conditions, training and promotion, social security, access to goods and services, maternity
protection and parental leave. In 1997 the Amsterdam Treaty enabled the gender dimension to
be integrated into all Community policies and established the principle of equal treatment as a
fundamental right. Since then, the Member States have introduced di¤erent policies and activities
ghting gender inequalities.1
As a matter of fact, the female participation rate in Europe has increased from around 55% in
the early 90s to more than 66% in 2008. In the same period womens employment rate has moved
to the same direction, by increasing from 49% to 61%. This steady improvement in women labor
market position has led to a signicant decline in the gender employment gap, which has nearly
halved since 1990, from more than 25% to almost 14% in 2008.2
The extent to which reforms and labor market institutions have contributed to such a pattern is
at the forefront of the political debate. Although there is a variety of studies looking at this issue
from di¤erent perspectives, the available evidence is still inconclusive (see Costa, 2000 and Del Boca
and Locatelli, 2006 for recent reviews). The main di¢ culty is disentangling the e¤ect of interest
from other (concurrent) factors that drive such patterns, such as: a) changes in cultural attitudes
towards work especially in countries where participation is traditionally lower3 ; b) changes in the
characteristics of the female population such as fertility decisions and elderly care responsibilities4
educational choices5 and demographic changes6 ; and c) reforms of the welfare state and changes of
labor market institutions and policies specically targeted at groups with lower attachment to the
labor market such as family-related subsidies7 and scal reductions8 .
Most of the studies looking at the evolution of the employment (or wage) gender gap over time
using individual data focus on a single country only, thus failing to capture important di¤erences
across European countries characterized by di¤erent welfare structures and cultural attitudes to-
1 In 1997, the Member States of the European Union (EU) unanimously decided to add a new article to the Ams-
terdam Treaty (Article 13). The new article enabled the Council to take appropriate actions to combat discrimination
based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.
2This information is retrieved from the OECD labour market statistics, http://stats.oecd.org/.
3Algan and Cahuc (2007), Fernandez (2007), Fortin (2005) and Giavazzi et al. (2009).
4Goodpaster (2010), Leigh (2010) and Munasinghe et al. (2008).
5Ermisch (2003), Euwals et al. (2011), Goldin (2006) and Gusta¤sson and Kenjoh (2008).
6Beaudry and Lemieux (1999), Fitzenberger et al. (2004) and Balleer et al. (2009).
7Anderson and Levine (1999), Attanasio, et al. (2008), Bardasi and Gornick (2003), Berlinski and Galiani (2007),
Jaumotte (2003), Powell (1998) Sánchez-Mangas and Sánchez-Marcos, (2008).
8Eissa and Liebman (1996) and Alesina and Ichino (2007).
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wards female labor market participation. Conversely, cross country comparisons using aggregate
data typically fail to distinguish compositional e¤ects (i.e. those arising from changes in the socio-
demographic characteristics of men and women over time) and to capture the responsiveness of
women with di¤erent individual characteristics to changes of the institutional settings (Jaumotte,
2003; Genre et al., 2010).
This paper investigates the changes in womens participation patterns across 15 EU countries
over the last 20 years using individual data from ECHP and EUSILC databases. Two are the main
contributions of our approach. First, we use individual data for an unusually large set of countries
and for a long time period (twenty years). Second, we provide a quantication of the role of labor
market institutional factors which is more precise than in previous studies.
Our analysis unfolds as follows.
We begin with an exploratory analysis of the data where individual information is used to com-
pute aggregate trends. Our aim here is to present a picture of each European country where we are
able to disentangle how much of the observed decline in the gender employment and participation
gaps can be simply attributed to changes in demographic and social characteristics between men and
females over time and how much of it needs to be attributed to changes in the institutional setting
and cultural attitudes. Our ndings reveal that a signicant part of the catching up of women labor
market performance can be attributed to forces which are not related to the increased similarity
between women and men in terms of socio-demographic factors such as for example education.
Next, we use a regression analysis to understand whether the impact of individual characteristics
on labor market participation varies across time and across countries in di¤erent welfare regimes.
Our estimates reveal that the observed aggregate increase in female participation in Europe hides
substantial di¤erences in several dimensions, not only across di¤erent groups of women and across
countries but also for the same group of women in di¤erent countries. Our ndings thus uncover
an important (and under-explored) cross-country heterogeneity in the factors which a¤ect women
labor market outcomes.
Finally, we further these results by exploiting a multi-level model specication to appreciate
how institutional and policy factors a¤ect womens choices between unpaid family responsibility
(child rearing and elderly care) and paid occupation. In particular, our multi-level regressions allow
(1) to disentangle how much of the observed variation in the female participation rate occurred
in Europe since the beginning of 90s is due to unobserved (individual and country) heterogeneity
versus observed labour market institutional and policy changes and (2) to assess whether such
changes have a¤ected di¤erently the participation of women with di¤erent characteristics. Although
those issues are at the forefront of the political debate, the existing empirical evidence is extremely
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scarce. Di¤erently from previous studies, which essentially capture the interplay between micro and
macro characteristics using interaction terms in (single-level) regression models,9 our approach can
better handle the hierarchical structure of the data (as we observe women nested in countries), thus
delivering more accurate estimates of any macro-e¤ects.
Our ndings point towards a strict interplay between the individual characteristics of female
population and the institutional and policy setting, revealing a role of institutional factors that is
stronger than what has so far been assessed. According to our results, the attitude to work of
young women with children appears to be favoured by policies aimed to support family and by the
expansion of exible forms of employment (especially in terms of xed term contracts) to the extent
that such forms of employment are not perceived to be of low quality. In particular, we quantify the
extent to which changes in the labor market behavior of women with specic characteristics (e.g.
young children) are to be attributed to changes in policies and institutions. Labor market reforms
and changes of social policies predict almost 25% of the actual increase in labor force participation
for young women, and more than 30% for highly educated women. However, the e¤ects of labor
market reforms on the participation of low skilled women in the labor force are surprisingly small.
This result is apparently in contrast with the existing empirical evidence which shows that less
educated women (with a lower attachment to work) are more responsive to work incentives created
by policy/institutional changes (Del Boca et al 2009). Nevertheless, we argue that in many European
countries, labour market reforms has led to a deterioration of job quality, especially for low educated
women, increasing the risk of dropping out from the labor force.10
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the relevance of the institutional
context in shaping womens choices between unpaid family responsibility and paid occupation and
dene our research questions. Section 3 describes the data and summarizes the large quantity of
micro-level information available for di¤erent European countries and across time using a synthetic
indicators of female labor market performance. Section 4 contains the results of a regression analysis
of womens involvement in the labor market across time and countries, whereas Section 5 analyses
more closely the role of the labor market institutional framework and social policies. Section 6
concludes.
9See, among the others, Stier et al. (2001) and Lippe (2001).
10Employment in Europe 2001 reports that drop-out rates from employment into unemployment or inactivity are
strongly linked to job quality. High levels of involuntary temporary contracts and part-time work are associated with
high drop out rates (some 15% into unemployment and 10% into inactivity). Del Boca et al (2009) show that the
inuence of part-time on participation is positive only where part-time jobs are perceived to be of high quality.
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2 Womens family responsibility, paid work and institutions
A large empirical literature provides evidence that the provision of facilities, parental leaves and
subsidies for day-care spaces and, more generally, policies aimed at alleviating the nancial burden
of child-rearing, have a positive e¤ect on female labor market integration by either increasing work
attachment (less women leaving occupation after childbirth) or facilitating women re-entry into the
labor market as children grow up (see, e.g., Sànchez-Mangas and Sànchez-Marcos, 2008, Lefebvre et
al., 2009).
Di¤erently from child care policies, there is still little evidence on the role of elderly care policies
and norms on womens attitude to paid work.11 Policies and practices concerning the reconciliation of
child care and employment may not be easily transferred to elderly care. First, caring responsibilities
for elderly usually occur at a later phase of work career than child care. Second elderly care is less
predictable in timing, duration and intensity (Keck and Saraceno, 2009). Theoretically, on the one
hand, the presence of monetary subsidies and publicly nanced elderly care services may have a
positive e¤ect on the choice of remaining in the labor force. On the other hand, unconditional
cash transfers for elderly care, when combined with other sources of income, such as the dependent
elderlys pension, may create an incentive trapby reducing the opportunity cost of informal care,
thereby exerting a negative impact on labor market participation of low income and low educated
women (Simonazzi, 2009)
Next to scal and social policies for the support of working mothers/elderly carers, the role played
by more general changes in the institutional context is gaining an increasing attention in the political
debate. In the last two decades, the labor markets in many European countries have experienced
deep changes towards the promotion of a exicurity model of labor market with the aim of increasing
competitiveness, employment creation and redistribution of work. Though the idea of deregulation
was the common factor behind the waves of reforms, the promotion of exicurity was pursued
through very di¤erent types of interventions on both the exibility and security side. In the Social
Democratic countries, reforms were mainly aimed to reduce the protection of insiders by reducing the
degree of employment protection on regular forms of employment on the one hand, and increasing
income security on the other.12 In the Southern countries and some Continental countries, exibility
has been obtained through marginal reforms which aimed at deregulating the use of temporary or
11With regard to the e¤ect of the presence of an elderly relative on women labour supply, the existing studies have
not evidenced a clear relationship. Wolf and Soldo (1994), estimating simultaneously the choice of employment and
elderly care cannot nd any negative relationship. Ettner (1995) for the US, Heitmueller and Michaud (2006) for the
UK and Casado et al. (2007) for Spain show that co-residing with a disabled senior person has a relevant discouraging
e¤ect on participation in the labour market. Chang and White-Means (1995) nd that co-residing with the senior
person has a negative e¤ect on women participation and that such e¤ect is particularly strong for low educated women.
12This is the so called Danish model of exicurity.
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"atypical" forms of employment while leaving largely unchanged the legislation applying to the stock
of workers employed under permanent (open-ended) contracts. In other countries, as for example in
the Netherlands, the emphasis of the reforms was to promote exible working time and part time
arrangements. Such reforms can be regarded as benecial to women to the extent they facilitate
labor market integration. However, this integration may occur at the risk of a reinforcement of the
traditional separation of gender roles in the labor market and within the family.
From the exibility side, the link between labor market deregulation and women participation
is not clear-cut, though there are a number of empirical studies which show that the negative
e¤ects of strict Employment Protection Legislations (EPL) are disproportionately larger for those
individuals (such as prime-age women) who are more subject to labor market entry problems. As
a result, in a rigid labor market, employment opportunities for prime age women are signicantly
reduced because they are more likely than men to move between employment and inactivity due to
the competing demands of work and family life (OECD, 2004; Heckman, J. and C. Pages, 2000).
From the security side, whether or not the presence of a generous system of unemployment benet
accompanied by active (and activation) policies increases incentives to work largely depends on the
eligibility requirements. In many countries, the access to social security and to active labor policies
are interdependent and depend on the past work history of workers (for example contribution records
showing recent and continuous employment). These requirements may represent a barrier for women
who may have interrupted careers and work part time. This implies that, while, on the one hand,
the burden of exibility is increasingly borne by women, on the other, women are more likely to be
excluded from benets and active policies. Thus, if women are in principle supposed to benet from
the combination of exibility in the labor market and security in the social system, the tendency
towards the exibilization of the labor market may exert a negative impact on the incentives to
participate when exible occupations are of lower quality and poorly securitized.
In this paper, we investigate the role of the welfare regime-specic characteristics in explaining
the observed trends in female labor market performance. We model two dimensions of welfare
regimes: (1) the social policies in support to families involved in informal care, both child-care and
elderly care, and (2) the institutional characteristics of the labor market in terms of the degree of
exibility and security.
More specically, we test two main hypotheses:
H1 : social policies more oriented to support families with young children (including the maternity,
parental and childcare leaves) and dependent elderly persons have a positive impact on women
participation, by weakening the trade-o¤ between informal care and paid work and positively
a¤ecting women labor market participation;
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H2 : changes in the institutional setting towards a model characterized by lower barriers to hiring
and ring combined with a higher social protection (passive labor market policies and active
labor market policies) have a positive impact on female labor market activity and this e¤ect
is larger for women who are more involved in family (unpaid) occupations.
We will refer to the variables capturing the characteristics of institutional context and policies
as macrofactors.
3 Data and exploratory evidence
3.1 The data
We combine micro data from two di¤erent sources, the ECHP (European Community Household
Panel) and the EU-SILC (European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions), to create
a unique dataset of comparable household and individual level characteristics across countries and
over time.
The ECHP micro data is a household survey with a common framework conducted across EU-
15 Member States under the supervision of Eurostat. The total duration of the ECHP is 8 years,
running from 1994 to 2001.13 The dataset includes information on family size and composition, living
conditions and several income measures. Therefore, it provides a source of mutually comparable
information at individual level for the EU member countries at the turn of the twentieth and twenty-
rst centuries.
EU-SILC (European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions) is the successor of the
ECHP. The EU-SILC provides harmonized cross-sectional and longitudinal multidimensional micro
data on income and social exclusion in the European countries, and it is the largest comparative
survey of European income and living conditions.14
In order to obtain a unique dataset of comparable household and individual level characteristics
across the EU countries within the whole period 1994-2009, we limited the analysis to the EU-15
Member States.15 The overall sample includes 1,657,367 individuals between 25 and 64 years old of
which 851,010 women and 806,357 men. A list of the variables used in this study, as well as summary
statistics for the women and men samples, are reported in Tables 1 and 2. The employment and
participation rates stand at 59% and 66%, respectively, for the female sample, and increase to
13ECHP data were rst collected in 1994, when a sample of 60,500 nationally representative households (i.e. ap-
proximately 130,000 adults aged over 16) were interviewed in 12 member states. Austria has joined the project in
the second wave in 1995, Finland in 1996, and Sweden in 1997. Therefore, since then, the data is covering all EU-15
member states.
14 In the 2004 wave, EU-SILC covered all EU-15 member states except Germany, Netherlands and the UK. Since
2005, the dataset involves the 25 EU member states, plus Norway and Iceland. The 2009 wave has been recently
released.
15Namely, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
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approximately 80% and 86%, respectively, for the male sample. The percentage of highly educated
women and men is 27% and women are slightly more represented than men among the lowest
educated individuals. Over 65% of respondents in both samples declares to live in-couple. 42% of
women and 23% of men live in households with at least one child under 14 years old, and 18% of them
live in households with at least one pre-school age child. Co-living with elderly (that is, individuals
with 70 years old or more) involves just 6% of all individuals in our sample. Approximately 27% of
those living in couple, have a partner with a lower or an upper secondary education (ISCED 0-2 and
ISCED 3-5); 20% of individuals have a highly-educated partner (ISCED 5-7). The variable "cycle"
measures the business cycle frequencies of national GDP over the survey years, 1994-2009. This
variable has been obtained by implementing the lter proposed by Hodrick and Prescott (1997).
3.2 A micro-data-based cross country comparison
We begin our analysis by providing some preliminary evidence of the changes in the gender gap
for participation and unemployment. Using data feom the OECD labor Force Statistics, Figures 1
and 2 show the evolution of the activity rates and unemployment rates in the di¤erent European
countries separated by gender. Figure 1 points towards the well-known onset of female labor market
participation, especially in countries with a traditionally low attachment of women to the labor mar-
ket such as Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain. Interestingly, Figure 2 shows that the unemployment
rates do not exhibit similarly marked trends. This evidence thus seem to suggests that the relevant
achievements of women in terms of labor market performance are to be attributed to the supply
side of the market. In fact, the increase in female activity rate originates from an increase of female
employment due to the increased willingness of women to work rather than from a decrease in the
unemployment rate. However, the relevant question that these aggregate indicators are not able to
answer is how much of these trends can be attributed to forces which are not related to the increased
similarity between women and men in terms of socio-demographic factors such as, for example, edu-
cation. Such changes in outcomes over and above those stemming from natural demographic trends
across countries and over time are of particular interest for policy purposes as they might be the
consequence of reforms in the institutional setting.
In our analysis, we use micro data to disentangle aggregate trends into di¤erent sources.
We start by looking at the extent to which women di¤er from men along two di¤erent labor
market indicators (participation and unemployment) in the di¤erent European countries, once the
inuence of demographic and social characteristics has been controlled for. We use the methodology
introduced by Vidgor (2008) to measure di¤erences between native and immigrants in US states
along cultural and economic lines. Such an approach allow us to summarize the large quantity of
micro-level information available for di¤erent European countries and across time in a way that eases
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cross-country comparisons.16 In words, the procedure predicts which individuals are females on the
basis of observed characteristics and then uses this nding to measure the gap between men and
females for a chosen outcome, such as the activity rate, by constructing a numeric index. The method
requires no prior assumptions regarding which characteristics are most e¤ective in distinguishing
women from men. Moreover, the inclusion of irrelevant characteristics that is, ones that do not
actually help to distinguish women from men has no impact on the index. Such an index ranges
between 0 and 1. It can be interpreted as an index of dissimilarity: the larger is the distance from 1,
the more females are di¤erent from men along the inspected labor market indicator, controlling for
other individual characteristics. More specically, we control for di¤erences in demographic factors
using individual information on age and the education level as well as in family structure using
marital status, partner education and number of children. A value of 1 for the index indicates that,
if those characteristics were equal between men and females, women and men would not di¤er in
terms of the chosen labor market outcome. Departing from 1 indicates that there are other forces
(other than those stemming from natural demographic trends) which make womens labor market
performance worse than the one of men.
We construct two di¤erent indices capturing gaps between women and men in labor market
participation (activity gap index) and unemployment (gap index for those in the labor force) (see
Appendix 1). The activity index captures di¤erences between women and men inside and outside
the labor market, thus revealing behavioral di¤erences more likely to come from the supply side
of the labor market. The unemployment index focuses on gender di¤erences for the individuals in
the labor market only, and hence captures the behavioral di¤erences more likely to come from the
demand side.
Figures 3 and 4 show the results.17 They reveal important cross-country di¤erences in the deter-
minants of the aggregate trends that were not captured in Figures 1 and 2. It appears that in most
of the countries with a signicant catching up of women labor market participation (such as the
Mediterranean countries, plus Ireland; Figure 1) changes in demographic and social characteristics
(i.e. the increasing similarity between women and men in terms of observable individual character-
istics) cannot explain all the shrinking in the gap. Indeed, our corresponding micro-based gender
gap indices in Figure 3 remain far from 1, although they are increasing towards 1 over time. This
evidence suggests that there are other forces which contributed to the observed remarkable increase
in womens involvement in the labor market. Similarly, the reduced gender gap in unemployment
16Technical details can be found in Appendix 1.
17For each European country and each year between 1994-2000 (ECHP data) and between 2004-2009 (EU-SILC
data) we compute the two di¤erent indicators and perform T-test statistics to assess signicant di¤erence between the
beginning and the end of the observed time window. The complete list of results is collected in Appendix 2 Tables
A1-A2.
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rates in Spain and the Netherlands (Figure 2) are associated with signicant movements in our
micro-based gender gap indices in Figure 4, indicating a limited role for changes in the female labor
force composition. On the other hand, the marked changes in female unemployment in Italy and
Finland (Figure 2), seem to be mainly due to demographic trends and other characteristics of the
female labor force factors rather than to changes in preferences, beliefs or labour market policies.
Indeed, when controlling for these factors, i.e. when looking at the results obtained using our indica-
tors in Figure 4, the changes in the unemployment gap between men and women in those countries
are not statistically signicant.
We now focus on the information provided by our di¤erent indices within the countries in the
sample. Interestingly, it appears a picture with a feature that is common to most of the European
countries: the marked changes in our micro-based gender gap index in activity rates are associated
with a substantial stability of the same index in unemployment rates. This nding reveals that
the observed changes in unemployment rates (or employment rates for those participating to the
labor force) largely reect changes in demographic and social factors, whereas other forces seem
to shape female participation rates. This evidence thus seem to provide some support to the idea
that female participation rates are driven by changes in country specic characteristics, such as
institutional reforms and cultural attitudes towards work. As stressed in the introduction, the
importance of these factors in inuencing labor market performance is receiving a growing attention
among economists.
In conclusion, our micro-based gender gap indices in activity and unemployment rates reveal a
relevant degree of cross country heterogeneity in the way the increased similarity between womens
and mens individual observable characteristics has contributed to the improvement in womens labor
market performance. Indeed, while in many countries the gradual decline of the gender di¤erences
in the characteristics of the labor force are able to explain most of the observed trends, in coun-
tries traditionally characterized by a persistent male breadwinner model the remarkable increase
of womens participation in the labor market must be attributed to country-specic changes which
a¤ect policies, institutions and cultural attitudes. In Europe, cultural di¤erences across countries
are largely reected in di¤erent welfare regimes. The following section looks in detail at the role
played by the welfare regimes in shaping womens labor market behavior.
4 Female labor market outcomes and welfare regimes
In this section, we evaluate how individual characteristics impact di¤erently the probability of par-
ticipating the labour market both across time and across welfare regimes. We estimate a standard
probit model for female labor supply separately for countries with di¤erent welfare regimes and
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then we interact the main determinants of participation with the trend variable in order to detect
di¤erences in trends for women with di¤erent characteristics.
4.1 Cross country di¤erences
Our basic regression model species the labor market status as:
ytij = X
t
ij + age
t
ij + trend
t + cycletj + ctyj + "
t
ij (1)
where y is the labor market status (active) at time t for individual (female) i in country j, age
are dummies for the age group of individual i (25-34; 35-44; 45-54; 55-64), cycle is a business
cycle indicator (country specic and time variant), trend is a common linear trend, cty are country
dummies and X is a set of individual characteristics observed at time t. Following the existing
empirical literature on women labor market participation, we include controls for the marital status,
the level of education, the partners level of education, and for family burden. In particular, besides
the traditional controls for family care involvement such as the presence, age and number of children,
we also include a dummy for the presence in the household of an elderly person above the age of 70
as a proxy for elder care burden. As Ettner (1995) points out, although the decision to care for a
senior person and the decision of fertility di¤er in many aspects, the inuence of the commitment
to caring for the elderly can be studied similarly to the commitment towards children.18
In order to investigate the di¤erences in the women labor market attitude across countries with
di¤erent welfare regimes, we follow the Ferreras (1996) classication and divide the countries of
our sample into four major groups: Southern (Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal), Social Democratic
(Sweden, Finland, Denmark), Liberal (United Kingdom) and Continental (Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Netherlands, Ireland, Luxemburg). Table 3 presents the estimation results for the whole
pooled sample (15 countries) in column 1 and for each welfare regime separately in columns 2-5.19
[TABLE 3 AROUND HERE]
The results in Table 3 show that there are important di¤erences across welfare regimes in the
impact of individual characteristics. Being married is negatively related to women participation and
employment and the e¤ect is stronger in those countries characterized by more traditional family
18 In some respect, the presence of an elderly relative in the household can be a better proxy of care burdens than
having children. This variable is indeed less a¤ected by endogeneity issues that may arise in the estimation as a
consequence of the possible inverse causal relationship between labour market status and the rational choice of having
a child (Cipollone and DIppoliti, 2011).
19Not surprisingly, the results for the employment rate are qualitatively the same as those reported for the par-
ticipation rate, with some di¤erences in the magnitude of the impacts. While activity rates are widely used as an
indicator of labour market involvement, it is increasingly recognized that employment and hours worked are the key
indicators for assessing women labour market integration (Jonung and Persson, 1993). One reason is that women
unemployment is often hidden among those dened as inactive because of the low work attachment of women of
specic groups (typically low skilled women with young children). Results are available upon request.
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structure such as continental and southern countries. Education is also another important deter-
minant of the female labor market status and, as expected, a high level of education leads to more
participation. The level of education of the partner has also a signicant impact on female partic-
ipation. Finally, the age e¤ects show the familiar hump-shaped pattern in both the participation
and employment, implying an increase in the probability of participating for the age group 35-44,
and then a lower probability for older groups.
Family care burdens are strong negatively related to female labor market involvement regardless
the welfare regime, though with some important di¤erences in the magnitude of the coe¢ cients. The
presence (and the number) of young children exhibits a negative impact and this e¤ect is signicantly
stronger if children are below 4 years old. Labor market participation increases gradually when the
child starts attending school and the child e¤ect reverses only when she attends secondary school
(around 14 years).20 The importance of childrens age di¤ers across regimes and is the most critical
in the UK. In Southern countries, which are characterized by lower participation rates for mothers,
the age of the youngest child exerts a less detrimental e¤ect on participation21 , thought the negative
e¤ect persists even when the child is of school age. Indeed, our estimates show that the probability
of participating for women with a child older than 14 (relative to women without children) is almost
4 percentage points lower in the South of Europe than in the Social Democratic countries, and 3
percentage lower than in Continental countries and the UK.
As for children, the estimated impact of elderly care responsibilities on participation is negative
and signicant and depends on the cultural attitude towards elderly relatives. In fact, such an e¤ect
is much lower in Southern countries where cohabiting with an elderly relative is a quite di¤use
practice and it is not necessarily related to the need of providing care.
Finally, the highest female participation rate is found among those aged in their late thirties/early
forties in all the welfare regimes groups we consider and the participation gap between old-aged
women (55-64) and younger groups is signicantly larger in Southern countries. This is explained
both by cultural reasons (older women are of a generation in which low female labor market involve-
ment is expected as part of a male breadwinner system) and by the presence of early retirement
20Note that the reported coe¢ cients should not be interpreted as causal e¤ects, as both participation and fertility
may be simultaneous decisions. This implies that the causal e¤ect of children on participation can be lower than those
estimated.
21This may be due to a number of factors, such as di¤erences in the composition of the labor force and in the
institutional setting. In countries where female labor force participation is low, women in employment are typically
characterized by a higher level of education, implying a stronger labor market attachment. Moreover, labor market
institutional rigidities in Southern countries - which make more di¢ cult (re)entering the labor market after a period
of temporary leave - may stimulate higher continuity in work attachment. This di¢ culty in re-entering the market
seems to be conrmed by the evidence that in the Social Democratic countries (and to a less extent in the Continental
countries) mothersparticipation and employment increase steadily as the youngest child grows up (mostly through
a re-entry to part time employment), in Southern countries the presence of children negatively a¤ects female labor
market participation, even when the child is of school age.
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pension schemes which favoured an early drop out.
After controlling for personal characteristics and country unobserved time invariant e¤ects, the
trend indicator is positive and signicant, implying that, on average, the probability of participating
is 0.18 percent higher in 2009 than in 1994.
4.2 Trends
We then allow the impact of the determinants of female labor behavior to vary over time by estimat-
ing the following model where the trend indicator is interacted with the individual characteristics:
ytij = X
t
ij + age
t
i + trend
t + cycletj + (2)
!(trendt  ageti) + (trendt Xtij) + ctyj + "tij
where trendtXtij captures changes over time in the labor market status of women with certain
characteristics. Such a specication answers questions such as: does the participation rate of women
with a high level of education change in 2007 with respect to 1994? As before, the equation (2) is
estimated on both the whole sample and each welfare regime separately. Table 4 reports the results.
[TABLE 4 AROUND HERE]
Overall, the evidence shows that there are important di¤erences in the trends of womens par-
ticipation, depending on both the personal and family characteristics of women and on the welfare
regimes. While in the UK, the positive trend is quite homogenous across women in di¤erent age
groups, in Continental and Southern countries, the increase in participation and employment is more
evident for older age groups and this is partly explained by cohort e¤ects.22 Education (and part-
ners education) appears to have an increasing role in stimulating women labor market involvement,
with some di¤erences across regimes. Indeed, we nd a signicant increase in the share of high
educated women leaving the inactivity status in the Continental and Social Democratic countries,
while, in Southern countries, the trend is stronger for women with a low-medium level of education.
Over time, the labour market participation increases for women with small children. Again,
such increase is not uniform across welfare regimes. It emerges that, between 1994 and 2009, the
negative impact of young children on women labor market involvement declined signicantly in Social
Democratic countries and to a less extent in Continental and Southern countries, while no trend has
been detected for the UK. This phenomenon may be related to a larger availability of market (child
22 In fact, while there is not a substantial di¤erence in the labor market behavior of women in their mid 20s and
30s (born after the early 1960s and grew up and educated after the feminist movement in the 70s), for those in their
mid 30s and 40s, the participation rate has increased by 11 percentage points, and for those older than 45 by almost
20 percentage points.
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care services) or non market child care services (i.e., husbands or relatives help) accompanied by
a shift in peoples values in all European countries (and to a larger extent in the most traditional
ones) from the traditional breadwinner arrangements in favour of a more equal gender division of
roles within the household. This change in the attitude towards working mothers could also have
been favoured by the expansion of exible forms of employment which facilitates the conciliation
between family responsibilities and paid work.
The negative impact of informal elderly care on participation has increased over time (with the
exception of Social Democratic countries). According to our results, the presence of a co-living
elderly persons has a positive (and signicant) impact on female labor market involvement at the
beginning of the sample period and then turns to be negative. This seems to be related to the
changing role of elderly relatives within the family, from providers of unpaid help within extended
family models to recipients of informal long-term care in the nuclear family (Leitner, 2003; Saraceno,
2010; Saraceno and Naldini, 2007).
In summary, the ndings in tables 3 and 4 show that the impact of family burden on women
labor market participation has changed in the last twenty years and such changes exhibit important
country-specic patterns. In the following sections, we further our understanding of the relevance
of institutional factors in shaping the womens decisions between unpaid family responsibility and
paid work.
5 The macro policy and institutional indicators
The previous section provides evidence that trends in female labor market participation di¤er signif-
icantly across countries in di¤erent welfare regimes. In this section, we study the role of the labour
market institutions and policies in explaining the observed trends by focussing on two dimensions
of welfare regimes: (1) the social policies in support to families involved in informal care, both
child-care and elderly care - hypothesis 1 in Section 2 -, and, (2) the institutional characteristics of
the labor market in terms of the degree of exibility and security - hypothesis 2 in Section 2 -. Given
the multilevel nature of our dataset (women nested in countries), we model female labour supply in
a micro-macro design using a multi-level approach. A similar approch has been used by Ward and
Dale (1992).23
23Di¤erently from the standard di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach with interaction terms between micro- and macro-
level variables and clustered standard errors, the multilevel method allows the researcher to estimate how much each
level of analysis is contributing to explanation in the model, and how much each level is contributing to the error. More
specically, the multilevel method allows one to analyze the explanatory power of a model by estimating the variance
components directly and, hence, to state what portion of a dependent variables variance is attributable to state-level
versus individual-level variation generated by both observable and unobservable factors. Moreover, the option of using
clustered robust standard errors to account for the intraclass correlation is a "weaker" form of correction than using
a multilevel model, which not only accounts for the intraclass correlation, but also corrects the denominator degrees
of freedom for the number of clusters. When using clustered robust standard errors, indeed, the denominator degrees
of freedom is based on the number of observations, not the number of clusters. Technical details and inferential issues
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5.1 The macro indicators
We collect several variables related to the country-specic socioeconomic context that are expected
to be important in shaping the inuence of housework and family related responsibilities on womens
attachment to local labor markets. We distinguish six relevant dimensions of cross-countries hetero-
geneity: the extent of employment protection legislation, passive and active labor market policies,
subsidies targeted to elderly people, subsidies targeted to families, and the extent of parental leave.
Table 5 presents a description of these dimensions, by reporting on their construction and their
specic components.
[TABLE 5 AROUND HERE]
In order to obtain uncorrelated synthetic indicators from the six macro variables, we employ a
Principal-Component Analysis (PCA) separately on the institutions-related dimensions and on the
policies-related dimensions.24 In keeping with common practice (Nardo et al. (2005), Nicoletti et
al. (1999), Kline (1994)), we have selected the rst factor of each PCA that satises the following
requirements: eigenvalues larger than 1, individual contribution to the explanation of the overall
variance larger than 10%, cumulative contribution to the explanation of the overall variance larger
than 50%. Within each factor, dimensions are weighted according to the proportion of the cross-
country variance explained by the factor itself. The results of the two PCA procedures are presented
in Table 6.
[TABLE 6 AROUND HERE]
The factor of the rst PCA (Factor 1, henceforth called POL) is highly correlated with parental
leaves and family subsidies (with factor loadings larger than 0.8) and moderately correlated with
the extent of subsidies to the elderly (factor loading approximately equal to 0.26). The higher the
load the more relevant in dening the factors dimensionality. Hence our rst factor reasonably
represents the generosity of national welfare regimes to households with dependent children. The
factor of the second PCA (Factor 2, henceforth called INST) is dened by active and passive labor
market policies (with factor loadings larger than 0.9), while the extent of employment protection
legislation exerts an inverse impact on it (with negative factor loading, -0.15). Hence, this factor
resumes the degree of exicurity of national labor market institutions.25
related to the application of the multilevel analysis techniques can be found in Hox (2010).
24Principal-Component Analysis (PCA) aims to convert a set of possibly correlated variables into a lower dimensional
set of linearly uncorrelated variables called principal components. These relevant factors are then rotated using the
varimax method to maximize the procedures e¢ ciency (Kline (1994)).
25The similarity between the standard denition of exicurity and our second factor is straightforward. Indeed, the
European Commission denes exicurity as an integrated strategy to simultaneously enhance exibility and security in
the labor market. It is traditionally implemented by means of: 1) exible and reliable contractual arrangements, which
are negatively correlated with employment protection; 2) e¤ective active labor market policies; and 3) modern social
security systems providing adequate income support during employment transitions, which are positively correlated
with passive labor market policies.
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5.2 The role of policies and institutions
Our econometric specication consists of a multi-level analysis based on our baseline probit model
(1). We allow both the intercept and the impacts of some individual characteristics (namely, having
small children and co-living with an old-aged dependent) to depend on the two country- specic
(but time variant) macroeconomic factors dened above: INST (labor market institutional context)
and POL (family oriented policies).
Our random coe¢ cient model is composed by a rst-level regression at individual level specied
as follows:
ytij = 
t
0j + 
t
11jCHILD
t
ij + 
t
12jELDERLY
t
ij + 20xt2ij + "tij (3)
and a second level set of regressions as follows:
t0j = 0 + 1INST
t
j + 2POL
t
j + 
t
j
t11j = 10 + 11INST
t
j + 12POL
t
j + 
t
1j
t12j = 20 + 21INST
t
j + 22POL
t
j + 
t
2j
where x2 is a set of additional controls which capture the impact of others micro-characteristics
on the likelihood of women participation.
We implement Generalized Linear Latent Models to estimate a two-level Random-Intercept Pro-
bit model and a two-level Random-Coe¢ cient Probit model, taking into account the nesting of
individuals in their country of origin.26 Di¤erently form the analysis carried on in section 4 we
now focus on women in prime age group (25-54) because family care burdens, such as child care
and elderly care, are less relevant for those in the elder group (55-64).27 The model is estimated
for the whole sample (pooled model) and then for each age group separately. We also test whether
and to what extent changes in family policies and labor market institutions a¤ect the labor market
decisions of women with di¤erent levels of education and estimate model (3) for the three education
groups (primary, secondary and tertiary education).
The results are reported in Table 7 (column 1 for the whole sample and columns 3-4 for the three
age groups separately) and in Table 8 for the three education groups.28
[TABLES 7 & 8 AROUND HERE]
Both the POL and INST indicators exert a signicant impact on womens likelihood of being
26Cipollone and DIppoliti (2011) carried on a similar analysis for Italy, exploiting territorial heterogeneity at
regional level.
27 In particular, the "variable co-living with an elderly relative (older than 70)" can simply capture the presence of
the partner rather then the presence of a relative in need of care.
28The estimated coe¢ cients on individual controls are consistent with those reported in the previous sessions and
and are available from the authors upon request.
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active, though their e¤ect is mediated by the type of unpaid work involvement (presence of child
or/and elder person) and di¤ers substantially across age and education groups.
Regarding the role of family policies (POL), the availability of childcare subsidies and child-
friendly policies have a positive impact on the activity rate of women with children and the e¤ect
is signicant for relative young women (25-34) at the early stage of their work life and, quite sur-
prisingly, for medium and high educated women. Indeed the e¤ect is not signicant for low skilled
women, whose employment opportunities are limited both in terms of the quality of jobs available
and wages.29
Conversely, policy measures to help women to combine caring and job responsibilities a¤ect
di¤erently the willingness to work of women co-living with an elderly person. The estimated e¤ect
is in general negative and signicant for older (age group 44-55) and low educated women. These
results show that the e¤ect of policies on womens choice between paid work and unpaid care crucially
depends on their outside family options and labor market potential outcomes. In general, cash
benets increase household income and rise the reservation wage at which women are available for
working. Therefore, more generous supports for child-related and elder-related costs are more likely
to discourage the labor market participation of low-skilled women in charge of family care, since
their labor market options (in terms of wage and type of jobs) are poorer.
Turning to the e¤ects of the institutions indicator (INST ), more exibility and/or more security
is employment-enhancing for young women (25-34) with small children despite the level of education.
These results imply that a larger availability of exicure job opportunities favors the labour market
participation of women with children, especially at the beginning of their working career, by reducing
the labor market entry costs.
Women with elderly care responsibility respond di¤erently to changes in the labour market
institutional framework. Higher labor exibility is detrimental for the labor market involvement
of women co-living with an elderly person. This result may be related to the fact that just few
countries in Europe have combined the two dimensions of exibility and security30 , and, in most
cases, deregulation is moving forward without su¢ cient social compensation. In this respect, the
growing availability of exible (low-paid jobs), which very often represent a forced alternative rather
than an option to more stable forms of employment, makes unpaid elderly caring more attractive than
paid occupations, especially in countries where family caring activities are supported by monetary
29Such results may be related to the fact that the indicator POL includes both in-kind (maternity and paternity
leaves, child care facilities ecc.) and monetary (family allowances) transfers. While the former have a positive impact
on mothers labour market attachement, the latter may have a negative impact which is stronger for low-income
mothers (Del Boca et al. 2009).
30Combining the two axes of exibility and security, Tangian (2007) concludes that only Denmark and Netherlands
are developing both dimensions.
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allowances that can be freely used to complement the family budget.31 This is conrmed by the
fact that the e¤ect holds for low-medium educated women whose work propensity is lower and work
opportunities are in general poorer.
To summarize, the institutional characteristics of the labour market and the social policy envi-
ronment a¤ect signicantly women labour market behavior, thought the e¤ect is mediated by the
womens individual characteristics. In particular, social policies aimed at those women involved in
family care, have a strong a signicant impact on the labour market participation of young mothers
with a medium-high level of education. The e¤ect is nevertheless negative when older and low skilled
women and involved in elderly care. The institutional characteristics of the labor market impact
signicantly on the participation of mothers at early stage of their working career who benet more
of a larger availability of exible forms of employment and a reduction of the labour market entry
costs. The same result does not hold for low skilled women with elderly care responsibilities.
Our results indicates that social policies and labor market institutional characteristics explain
a non-negligible percentage of the womens labour market participation across European countries.
The variance partition coe¢ cient (VPC) for the overall model (Table 7, column 1) is approximately
equal to 0.06, which indicates that 6% of of the variability in the participation rates can be attributed
to countries factors. This coe¢ cient increases when the model is separately estimated by age-
group and educational level. In particular, macroeconomic heterogeneity is particularly relevant
in explaining cross-country di¤erences in the participation rates of younger and less skilled women
(VPC increases up to 20% and 11% respectively), while more than 95% of variability of participation
of women between 45 and 55 years old is due to individual characteristiocs. The macro factors INST
and POL explain up to 67% of the overall cross-countries variance, as shown by the level-2 variance
partition coe¢ cients. Thus there remains some country-level variance unaccounted for in the model.
This may be attributed to changes in cultural attitude towards female labor market involvement, as
well as other country-specic time-variant factors which have not been explicitly considered in the
model.
5.3 The role of exicurity
In the last set of regressions we focus more specically on the impact of exicurity on women labor
market involvement by disentangling the impact of the two components of the indicator INST :
exibility (FLEX) and security (SEC) and their interaction (FLEX  SEC).
The results for the pooled sample (column 1) and for the three age groups separately (columns
2-4) are reported in Table 9, while in Table 10 we run the same regressions for women with di¤erent
levels of education.
31See Simonazzi (2009) for a detailed analysis of the recent dynamics of the care sector in the EU countries.
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[TABLES 9 & 10 AROUND HERE]
Table 9 shows that a higher degree of labor exibility has a positive e¤ect on the activity rate
only if it is accompanied by policies which are aimed to guarantee access to employment security in
terms of both active labor market policies and the inclusiveness of the unemployment benets. At
the same time, a larger degree of security is benecial for womens involvement only in su¢ ciently
exible labor markets which provide an easier access to employment. The impacts of exibility,
security and their interactions are signicant and qualitatively the same across age groups with
the exception of those in the oldest age group (44-54 in our sample). The interaction between
exibility and security are stronger for young women at the early stage of their working career and,
consistently with the results found in the previous set of regressions, for those women with family
care responsibilities. These results suggest that combining a high degree of labor market exibility
with a high level of social protection leads to signicant gains in terms of womens labor market
participation, while omitting one of the two aspects can produce sub-optimal (or even negative)
outcomes in terms of labor market performance. The marginal e¤ect of exibility on female activity
rate turns to be positive in correspondence of a value of the security indicator above 2.00 (2.05 for
women with young children and 1.92 for women involved in elderly care). On the other hand, the
marginal e¤ect of security turns to be positive for value of the exibility indicator above 1.76 (1.60
and 1.92 for women involved in child and elderly care respectively).
In Figure 5 we can observe that in the period 2004-2009, the countries for which both the
exibility and security indicators are above the estimated thresholds are the Social Democratic
countries (though Sweden only marginally), Netherlands and at the margin Belgium, and Germany.32
After the institutional reforms implemented in the late nineties and early 2000s to promote a more
exible labor market, Italy appears still decient on the security side. The opposite holds for France
and Spain which are still characterized by a rigid labor market. Greece and Portugal remain well
below both the thresholds.
[FIGURE 5 AROUND HERE].
The picture that emerges from this last exercise can be summarized by saying that in the Social
Democratic and some central European countries, institutional changes towards the exicurity model
are correlated with positive trends in female labor market participation and this is particular true for
young women with kids. On the contrary, in southern European countries and the UK, the security
and exibility mix of workersjobs is not enough to stimulate womens involvement in labor market.
32 Notice that the Social Democratic countries (and to less extent the Continental countries) are also those countries
for which we estimated the strongest (negative) trend in the e¤ect of young children on female participation (see table
4).
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5.4 Quantifying the inuence of institutions and social policies
We now provide a more precise quantication of the e¤ects of labour market exibility and security
and of the social policies in support to families in shaping womenactivity rate. Following the growth
accounting methodology proposed by Stoker (1985), it is possible to show that, under plausible
restrictions, a rst-order di¤erence of our multilevel model provides an Oaxaca-fashion decomposition
of changes in women activity rates. Such a decomposition enables us to asses how much of the
observed growth in female labor force participation is due to changes in the macro factors (INST and
POL); as opposed to changes from other sources (such as changes in the individual characteristics).
More specically, the variation of the female activity rate between two periods can be decomposed in
ve di¤erent components. The rst term describes how much of the change in women participation
rate comes exclusively from changes in individual characteristics, the second term quanties how
much of that change is due to the interplay between - individual characteristics and country-specic
unobserved heterogeneity, the third term capture the e¤ects arising from the interaction between
changes in individual characteristics and observed macro factors, whereas the fourth component
captures the inuence of changes in the macro factors INST and POL. The fth term is a residual
component. The technical details of this decomposition are reported in the Appendix 2.
Table 11 collects the estimation results which are obtained using the decomposition for the whole
sample, whereas Table 12 shows the evidence for the four welfare regimes separately.
[TABLES 11 & 12 AROUND HERE]
On average, 6:2% of the overall increase in female participation between 1994 and 2009 is associ-
ated with changes in the institution and policy indicators. Only a small part of the actual rise over
time in the proportion employed is associated with the changes in the indicators of institutions and
policies in southern countries (around 3%), while the contribution is remarkable higher in the social
democratic countries. For these countries, the INST and POL indicators predict more than 14% of
the actual change in the female participation. This last result is in line with the ndings discussed in
the previous session, which show that in the social democratic regime, institutional changes towards
the exicurity model are correlated with positive trends in female labor market participation.
Table 13 and Table 14 presents the estimation results for the three age and the three education
groups respectively.
[TABLES 11 & 12 AROUND HERE]
These results indicate that the contribution of changes of institutions and policies to the growth
of female participation is considerably higher when it is calculated for young (24:6%) women and
for high skilled women (38:6%). In line with the previous literature, these ndings conrm that the
social welfare changes and the labor market regulatory reforms in Europe contribute to explain the
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observed trends in the activity rate of women who face higher labour market entry costs, such as
young women who are at the beginning of their working career and more involved in child care duties.
Interestingly, the mix of labour market reforms and policies changes which have been implemented
in Europe in the last 20 years fail to explain the observed pattern of the activity rate of low-educated
women.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we provide detailed macro evidence on trends of female labor market participation in
the last twenty years for a large set of EU countries using micro data from the ECHP and EU-SILC
surveys. Three main results emerge from our analysis.
First, we show that the observed remarkable increase in womens labor market participation
between 1994 and 2009 can be explained by signicant change in the impact of individual charac-
teristics on womens labor supply. For example, according to our results, the negative impact of
childcare on womens participation has declined over time, while informal elderly care has increas-
ingly reduced the likelihood of women to supply labor. Moreover, we nd that the observed trends
in the labor market participation of women have not been uniform across welfare regimes.
Second, we nd that the estimated trends in female labour market participation are related to
di¤erences of the labour market institutional setting and of the social policy environment across
the countries in the sample. Such policy and institutional factors have an important impact on the
labor market opportunities of women by a¤ecting the quality of potential jobs available, the chances
to (re-)enter the labor market and the opportunity costs of employment (vs non-employment).
However, these e¤ects vary across women with di¤erent characteristics, such as the type of family
care involvement, the age and the level of education. In particular, the observed positive trend in
the attitude to work of women with children appears to be favoured by the expansion of exible
forms of employment (especially in terms of xed term contracts) which have progressively eased
the labor market access and the reconciliation of family child responsibilities with paid work. This
positive e¤ect is stronger for women in the early stage of their work life despite the level of education.
Generous child and family benets and maternity/paternity leaves have a positive impact on women
labor market attachment of young mothers, and the e¤ect is stronger for medium-high educated
individual.
Third, our analysis reveals that the positive trend in female activity rate is related to changes in
the institutional framework towards the exicurity model in countries such as Denmark and Nether-
lands which are characterized by a balanced mix of exibility and security. The policy implications
of this last set of results are clear: reforms of employment protection towards a larger degree of ex-
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ibility need to be accompanied by an increase in state-provided security. Such a mix of institutional
reforms will guarantee, on the one hand, lower entry costs for individuals with a weaker attachment
to work and, on the other, a set of incentives to actively participate to the labor market.
Finally, we provide a quantication of how much of the observed trend in women labour market
participation can be attributed to changes in the labour market institutional setting and family
policies through a simple decomposition exercise. We nd that the mix of institutional and policy
changes accounts for almost 25% of the increase of the labour market participation of young women
(around 2.5 percentage points) and 38% of the participation of high educated women (around 1.5
percentage points). Our results also reveal that the changing institutional and policy setting has
not favoured the labour market integration of low skilled women in Europe.
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A APPENDIX 1
A.1 Vigdor index: methodological framework
Let us dene D to be a binary variable taking the value 0 if the individual is in group 0, 1 if he/she
is in group 1. We are interested in assessing di¤erences between group 0 and group 1 using a one-
dimensional measure of how di¤erent are the distributions of some characteristics x between group
0 and 1.
Let us denote by fo(x) the density function of x among group 0 individuals (reference group),
f1(x) the density function of x among group 1 individuals.
Vigdor (2008) estimates a model for
P (D = 1jx) = pf1(x)
pf1(x) + (1  p)pf0(x) =
pf1(x)
f(x)
= (x); (4)
where p is the proportion of group 1 individuals in the population and f(x) is the density function
of x in the population. A generalization of the Vidgor index which is between zero and one and is
composition invariant (i.e. it does not depend on p) is
I = 2
Z
f0(x)f1(x)
f0(x) + f1(x)
dx = 2
Z
1
1 + g(x)
f1(x)dx:
Such an analysis is based on the ratio g(x) = f1(x)f0(x) which will be equal to 1 if group 0 and 1
have the same distribution of x. This implies that any di¤erence in the observed x will result in a
discrepancy between group 0 and 1 in the synthetic index.
An important empirical issue is that there might be some characteristics z whose di¤erences
between group 0 and 1 are not appropriate to take into consideration in infer a behavioral di¤erence
between group 0 and 1. For example, we do not want to label di¤erences in the age structures between
two groups as di¤erences in labor market behavior between the two groups. The unconditional
distribution of x (as in (4)) will be di¤erent if individuals in group 0 and 1 have a di¤erent distribution
of z. An analysis based on (4) would be misleading. For example, if group 0 and group 1 are women
and men, we do not want to capture di¤erences in labor market performance between women and
men due to di¤erent gender population structure. Gender demographic trends are correlated to
di¤erences in employment, labour market participation or job types, but they are not a matter of
research themselves. Therefore, we need to work with the distribution of x given z.
Denote by fo(xjz) the density function of x given z among group 0 individuals, f1(xjz) the
density function of x given z among group 1 individuals. Dene the marginal distributions of z
among group 0 and 1, ho(z) and h1(z) respectively. We are thus interested in the ratio between
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density functions
g(xjz) = f1(xjz)
f0(xjz) =
f1(x; z)
f0(x; z)
ho(z)
h1(z)
: (5)
A generalization of the Vidgor index which allows for the presence of z variables, while remaining
composition invariant, is33
I = 2
Z
1
1 + g(xjz)f1(xjz)h1(z)dxdz (6)
Empirically, one has to get an estimate of g(xjz): One way to proceed is as follows.
First, estimate a probit model for being an individual of group 1 on x and z
P (D = 1jx; z) = pf1(x; z)
pf1(x; z) + (1  p)f0(x; z) =
pf1(x; z)
f(x; z)
= (x; z): (7)
We can write
f1(x; z)
f0(x; z)
=
(x; z)
[1  (x; z)]
(1  p)
p
:
Substituting into (5), we have that
g(xjz) = (x; z)
[1  (x; z)]
(1  p)
p
ho(z)
h1(z)
: (8)
Second, estimate a probit model for being an individual of group 1 conditional on z alone
P (D = 1jz) = ph1(z)
ph1(z) + (1  p)h0(z) = '(z): (9)
We can write
ho(z)
h1(z)
=
'(z)
[1  '(z)]
(1  p)
p
:
Substituting into (8) we have that
g(xjz) = (x; z)
[1  (x; z)]
[1  '(z)]
'(z)
:
In short, the relative densities of x conditional on z can be estimated from the predicted proba-
bilities of two probit models for being an individual in group 1, one conditional on x and z and the
other conditional on z alone.
33The Vidgor index (Vidgor, 2008) is derived for a value of p=0.5 and does not explicity deal with di¤erences
between x and z variables.
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Having g(xjz) on hand, the average value of the transformation 11+g(xjz) across group 1 individ-
uals, will then give the synthetic index (6).34
A.2 Adaptation to our setting
In our analysis we dene D as a dummy taking value 1 if the individual is female (disadvantaged
group) and 0 otherwise. We consider two x variables, xk; k = 1; 2 :
- x1 : dummy taking value 1 if the individual is inactive, and 0 if active (participation rate);
- x2 : dummy taking value 1 if the active individual is employed, and 0 if unemployed
(unemployment rate).
We use as control variables z the individual education level, marital status, partner education,
number of children and age.
We thus derive two synthetic indicators (activity index and employment index) for each European
country and each year between 1994-2000 (ECHP) and between 2004-2009 (EU-SILC) and we
perform T-test statistics to assess signicant di¤erence between the begin and the end of the observed
time window. Tables in Appendix 3 collects the complete list of results.
34Algan et al. (2012) use this analysis to study cultural and economic integration patterns of immigrants in Europe.
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B APPENDIX 2
B.1 An algebric decompostion
Let us consider model 3:
ytij = 
t
0j + 
t
11jCHILD
t
ij + 
t
12jELDERLY
t
ij + 20xt2ij + "tij
where
t0j = 0 + 1INST
t
j + 2POL
t
j + 
t
j
t11j = 10 + 11INST
t
j + 12POL
t
j + 
t
1j
t12j = 20 + 21INST
t
j + 22POL
t
j + 
t
2j
For simplicity of exposition, let us dene xt1ij a vector of individual characteristics whose impact
depends on macro-factors (which in our model 3 include CHILD and ELDERLY ).
We obtain:
ytij = 
t
0j +
 
xt1ij
 0t1j +  xt2ij 0t2j + "tij (10)
with:
t0j = 
t
0 +
 
zt1ij
 0t1j + tj
t1j = 
t
0 +
 
zt1ij
 0t1j + tj
Hence:
ytij = 
t
0 +
 
zt1ij
 0t1j +  xt1ij 0t0 +  xt1ij 0t1j  zt1ij 0+  xt2ij 0t2j +Rt (11)
with:
 
xt1ij ;
t
1j ;
t
0;
t
1j

asm1 vectors;  xt2ij ;t2j as n1 vectors;  zt1ij ;t1j ; t1j as p1 vectors.
Let us take rst-di¤erences
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ytij yt 1ij =
 
t0   t 10

+
 
zt1ij
 0  t1j   t 11j +  zt1ij   zt 11ij  0t 11j  (12)
+
 
xt1ij
 0  t0   t 10 +  xt1ij   xt 11ij  0t 10 
+
 
xt2ij
 0  t2   t 12 +  xt2ij   xt 12ij  0t 12 
+
 
xt1ij
 0  t1   t 11  zt1ij +  xt1ij  zt1ij 0   xt 11ij  zt 11ij  0t 11 
+

Rt  Rt 1
The model 12 is equivalent to Stoker (1985), which decomposes the change of an aggregate
variable (here the proportion of women who participate) into a change of the behavioural micro
model (coe¢ cients of 11 foe a series of cross-sections) and a change in the distribution of the micro
variables (education, fertility, marital status, etc.). Since our aim is to quantify the role of changes
in macro-factors on female decisions, we impose that the coe¢ cient estimates of model 12 do not
vary over time: in this way, we are able to use our multilevel model 3 to disentangle how much of
changes in behaviour over time depends on changes in policy regulations.35 In other words, we apply
the following restrictions to model 12:
 t0 = t 10 = 0;
 t2 = t 12 = 2;
 t0 = t 10 = 0;
 t1 = t 11 = 1;
 t1 = t 11 = 1;
 t0 = t 10 = 0:
The simplyed model is
35Through this simplication, we neglet variations on the coe¢ cient estimates due to changes on preferences which
are not related to macro-factors.
Since our aim is to quantify the role of changes in macro-factors on female decisions, this simplication does not
a¤ect our results.
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ytij yt 1ij =
 
xt2ij   xt 12ij
 02+
+
 
ztj   zt 1j
 01 +  ztj   zt 1j  01  xt 11ij 
+
 
xt1ij   xt 11ij
 00 +  zt1ij 01  xt1ij   xt 11ij 
+

Rt  Rt 1
  individual characteristics x2 whose e¤ect does not depend on macro factors z
+  in macro factors z+
+  individual characteristics x1 whose e¤ect depends on macro factors z
+ residual component
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C  APPENDIX 3 
Synthetic indicator: complete list of results 
Table C1 - Activity gap by country and year 
 Year 
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 P-VALUE 
AT  0.8742 0.9031 0.9068 0.8954 0.9139 0.9192 0.9161 0.9126 0.9176 0.9232 0.9260 0.9443 0.0000 
BE 0.9427 0.9394 0.9384 0.9348 0.9550 0.9547 0.9555 0.9587 0.9676 0.9685 0.9749 0.9763 0.9754 0.0000 
DE 0.9622 0.9622 0.9622 0.9622 0.9622 0.9622 0.9622  0.9622 0.9622 0.9622 0.9622 0.9622 0.5761 
DK 0.9858 0.9844 0.9783 0.9829 0.9859 0.9897 0.9899 0.9834 0.9931 0.9905 0.9936 0.9907 0.9984 0.0000 
ES 0.7959 0.7916 0.7958 0.8054 0.8152 0.8328 0.8408 0.8961 0.9021 0.9147 0.9285 0.9391 0.9454 0.0000 
FI   0.9975 0.9972 0.9943 0.9933 0.9954 0.9872 0.9889 0.9884 0.9869 0.9856 0.9811 0.0000 
FR 0.9521 0.9293 0.9234 0.9280 0.9349 0.9437 0.9444 0.9797 0.9824 0.9874 0.9888  0.9843 0.0000 
GR 0.8104 0.8167 0.8089 0.8197 0.8266 0.8114 0.8405 0.8937 0.9000 0.9005 0.9073 0.9148 0.9201 0.0000 
IE 0.7166 0.7383 0.7744 0.7903 0.8129 0.8430 0.8632 0.9094 0.9020 0.8871 0.9106 0.9048 0.9094 0.0000 
IT 0.8110 0.8287 0.8269 0.8398 0.8477 0.8604 0.8499 0.9275 0.9191 0.9173 0.9213 0.9203 0.9287 0.0000 
LU  0.7657 0.7573 0.7883 0.7929 0.7949 0.8084 0.8741 0.8829 0.8844 0.9146 0.9166 0.9128 0.0000 
NL 0.9311 0.9608 0.9567 0.9623 0.9708 0.9706 0.9676  0.8974 0.9523 0.9596 0.9672 0.9747 0.0000 
PT 0.8719 0.8894 0.9058 0.9132 0.9151 0.9278 0.9279 0.9537 0.9614 0.9649 0.9727 0.9638 0.9657 0.0000 
SE    0.9962 0.9962 0.9962 0.9962 0.9962 0.9962 0.9962 0.9962 0.9962 0.9962 0.6140 
UK 0.9521 0.9578 0.9572 0.9533 0.9583 0.9622 0.9621  0.9649 0.9545 0.9738 0.9686 0.9693 0.0008 
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Table C2 – Unemployment gap by country and year 
 Year 
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 P-VALUE 
AT  1,0000 0,9999 1,0000 0,9987 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 0,9991 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 0.2003 
BE 0,9887 0,9887 0,9887 0,9887 0,9887 0,9887 0,9887 0,9887 0,9887 0,9887 0,9887 0,9887 0,9887 0.1005 
DE 0,9986 0,9978 0,9987 0,9999 0,9993 0,9989 0,9997  0,9978 1,0000 0,9993 0,9999 1,0000 0.0001 
DK 0,9975 0,9872 0,9946 0,9925 0,9931 0,9961 0,9920 0,9999 0,9994 0,9982 0,9976 0,9992 1,0000 0.0129 
ES 0,9951 0,9939 0,9943 0,9948 0,9945 0,9912 0,9868 0,9833 0,9844 0,9852 0,9848 0,9949 0,9987 0.0121 
FI   1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 0.2797 
FR 0,9964 0,9926 0,9949 0,9931 0,9902 0,9895 0,9904 0,9997 0,9982 0,9959 0,9958  0,9999 0.0008 
GR 0,9788 0,9809 0,9830 0,9851 0,9865 0,9870 0,9922 0,9870 0,9866 0,9845 0,9872 0,9920 0,9932 0.0005 
IE 0,9686 0,9722 0,9771 0,9688 0,9780 0,9901 0,9996 0,9924 0,9904 0,9925 0,9945 0,9860 0,9825 0.0011 
IT 0,9948 0,9961 0,9953 0,9926 0,9948 0,9935 0,9954 0,9933 0,9921 0,9914 0,9920 0,9912 0,9920 0.0869 
LU  1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 0.3528 
NL 0,9765 0,9637 0,9718 0,9702 0,9735 0,9704 0,9801  0,9997 0,9997 1,0000 1,0000 0,9998 0.0000 
PT 0,9944 0,9983 0,9939 0,9987 0,9968 0,9981 0,9988 0,9994 0,9954 0,9984 0,9992 0,9969 0,9997 0.0226 
SE    1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 0.9503 
UK 0,9865 0,9966 0,9926 0,9965 0,9955 0,9956 0,9996  0,9989 0,9954 0,9967 0,9967 0,9959 0.0000 
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Table 1. Summary statistics: female sample

 
 
  Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Individual Characteristics 
employed 851010 0.594 0.491 0 1 
active 851010 0.656 0.475 0 1 
male 851010 0.000 0.000 0 0 
age 851010 44.269 11.078 25 64 
ISCED03 832447 0.382 0.486 0 1 
ISCED35 832447 0.344 0.475 0 1 
ISCED57 832447 0.274 0.446 0 1 
single 844864 0.189 0.392 0 1 
incouple 844864 0.687 0.464 0 1 
separated 844864 0.018 0.132 0 1 
divorced 844864 0.067 0.250 0 1 
widowed 844864 0.039 0.193 0 1 
Household Characteritsics 
children 851010 0.713 1.008 0 15 
child 851010 0.422 0.494 0 1 
child06 851010 0.179 0.383 0 1 
child03 851010 0.096 0.295 0 1 
child36 851010 0.113 0.317 0 1 
child614 851010 0.259 0.438 0 1 
old70 851010 0.060 0.238 0 1 
pISCED03 851010 0.276 0.447 0 1 
pISCED35 851010 0.258 0.438 0 1 
pISCED57 851010 0.198 0.398 0 1 
Trend 
year 851010 2003 4.983 1994 2009 
cycle 842730 0.006 1.958 -8.636 4.172 
Country of residence 
DK 851010 0.044 0.206 0 1 
NL 851010 0.070 0.255 0 1 
BE 851010 0.045 0.207 0 1 
FR 851010 0.074 0.262 0 1 
IE 851010 0.043 0.203 0 1 
IT 851010 0.156 0.362 0 1 
GR 851010 0.060 0.237 0 1 
ES 851010 0.111 0.314 0 1 
PT 851010 0.054 0.227 0 1 
AT 851010 0.043 0.204 0 1 
FI 851010 0.068 0.252 0 1 
SE 851010 0.048 0.213 0 1 
DE 851010 0.087 0.282 0 1 
LU 851010 0.035 0.183 0 1 
UK 851010 0.062 0.241 0 1 
 
                                                 
 ISCED02 (pISCED02): lower secondary education of the woman (of her partner); ISCED35 (pISCED35): upper 
secondary education of the woman (of her partner); ISCED57 (pISCED57): tertiary education of the woman (of her 
partner). 
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Table 2. Summary statistics: male sample 

 
 
  Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Individual Characteristics 
employed 806357 0.797 0.402 0 1 
active 806357 0.857 0.350 0 1 
male 806357 1.000 0.000 1 1 
age 806357 44.229 11.137 25 64 
ISCED03 788367 0.360 0.480 0 1 
ISCED35 788367 0.368 0.482 0 1 
ISCED57 788367 0.273 0.445 0 1 
single 799834 0.257 0.437 0 1 
incouple 799834 0.675 0.468 0 1 
separated 799834 0.013 0.112 0 1 
divorced 799834 0.046 0.209 0 1 
widowed 799834 0.010 0.098 0 1 
Household Characteritsics 
children 806357 0.435 0.925 0 14 
child 806357 0.225 0.418 0 1 
child06 806357 0.180 0.384 0 1 
child03 806357 0.100 0.300 0 1 
child36 806357 0.112 0.315 0 1 
child614 806357 0.244 0.430 0 1 
old70 806357 0.061 0.239 0 1 
pISCED03 806357 0.278 0.448 0 1 
pISCED35 806357 0.261 0.439 0 1 
pISCED57 806357 0.198 0.398 0 1 
Trend 
year 806357 2003.000 4.985 1994 2009 
cycle 798435 0.012 1.959 -8.636 4.172 
Country of residence 
DK 806357 0.045 0.207 0 1 
NL 806357 0.068 0.253 0 1 
BE 806357 0.044 0.205 0 1 
FR 806357 0.073 0.261 0 1 
IE 806357 0.043 0.202 0 1 
IT 806357 0.159 0.366 0 1 
GR 806357 0.060 0.238 0 1 
ES 806357 0.111 0.314 0 1 
PT 806357 0.053 0.224 0 1 
AT 806357 0.043 0.203 0 1 
FI 806357 0.073 0.260 0 1 
SE 806357 0.049 0.216 0 1 
DE 806357 0.083 0.276 0 1 
LU 806357 0.036 0.187 0 1 
UK 806357 0.059 0.235 0 1 
                                                 
 ISCED02 (pISCED02): lower secondary education of the man (of his partner); ISCED35 (pISCED35): upper secondary 
education of the man (of his partner); ISCED57 (pISCED57): tertiary education of the man (of his partner). 
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Table 3: Female  activity by welfare regimes 
 
 
ALL LIBERAL CONTINENTAL DEMOCRATIC SOUTHERN 
 Coef.  St.Err. Coef.  St.Err. Coef.  St.Err. Coef.  St.Err. Coef.  St.Err. 
Marital status                
Single                
incouple -0.071 *** 0.003 -0.009  0.010 -0.098 *** 0.005 -0.022 *** 0.005 -0.109 *** 0.006 
separated 0.057 *** 0.007 0.022  0.018 0.056 *** 0.016 -0.006  0.024 0.100 *** 0.009 
divorced 0.05 *** 0.004 0.036 *** 0.012 0.033 *** 0.006 -0.013 * 0.007 0.125 *** 0.008 
widowed -0.067 *** 0.006 0.019  0.013 -0.100 *** 0.011 -0.021 * 0.013 -0.109 *** 0.009 
Children                
No children                
children -0.038 *** 0.003 -0.027 ** 0.012 -0.036 *** 0.005 -0.036 *** 0.006 -0.039 *** 0.004 
child 0.043 *** 0.005 0.064 *** 0.017 0.061 *** 0.008 0.073 *** 0.008 0.035 *** 0.007 
child03 -0.174 *** 0.004 -0.275 *** 0.012 -0.254 *** 0.007 -0.173 *** 0.007 -0.073 *** 0.006 
child36 -0.088 *** 0.003 -0.177 *** 0.011 -0.082 *** 0.006 -0.002  0.006 -0.064 *** 0.005 
child614 -0.067 *** 0.003 -0.129 *** 0.008 -0.064 *** 0.005 0.027 *** 0.005 -0.061 *** 0.004 
Co-habiting Elderly                
no_elderly                
old70-80 -0.068 *** 0.005 -0.183 *** 0.023 -0.149 *** 0.014 -0.151 *** 0.016 -0.029 *** 0.006 
old80 -0.025 *** 0.006 -0.080 *** 0.032 -0.036 ** 0.017 -0.121 *** 0.029 -0.010  0.008 
Education                
Low skilled                
ISCED35 0.122 *** 0.002 0.177 *** 0.008 0.096 *** 0.004 0.091 *** 0.004 0.135 *** 0.003 
ISCED57 0.214 *** 0.003 0.223 *** 0.008 0.176 *** 0.004 0.138 *** 0.005 0.266 *** 0.004 
pISCED03 -0.016 *** 0.003 0.035 *** 0.011 0.000  0.007 0.049 *** 0.006 -0.033 *** 0.006 
pISCED35 0.039 *** 0.003 0.078 *** 0.009 0.044 *** 0.005 0.067 *** 0.005 0.017 *** 0.006 
pISCED57 0.018 *** 0.004 0.042 *** 0.009 0.023 *** 0.006 0.058 *** 0.005 0.014 ** 0.007 
Age                
Age_25-34                
age_35_44 0.052 *** 0.003 0.039 *** 0.009 0.067 *** 0.005 0.074 *** 0.005 0.034 *** 0.005 
age_45_54 -0.013 *** 0.003 -0.056 *** 0.011 0.018 *** 0.006 0.089 *** 0.005 -0.054 *** 0.005 
age_55_64 -0.295 *** 0.004 -0.300 *** 0.012 -0.301 *** 0.007 -0.078 *** 0.007 -0.366 *** 0.005 
Macro                
trend 0.012 *** 0.001 0.008 *** 0.003 0.019 *** 0.001 0.004 *** 0.001 0.009 *** 0.001 
cycle 0.003 *** 0.001 0.000  0.002 0.007 *** 0.001 0.000  0.001 -0.001  0.001 
UK    Ref.            
DK 0.075 *** 0.005       Ref.      
NL -0.039 *** 0.004    0.008  0.006       
BE 0.018 *** 0.004    0.065 *** 0.005       
FR 0.078 *** 0.004    0.128 *** 0.005       
IE -0.046 *** 0.005    Ref.         
IT -0.077 *** 0.004          -0.292 *** 0.005 
GR -0.041 *** 0.004          -0.263 *** 0.006 
ES 0.012 *** 0.004          -0.201 *** 0.006 
PT 0.159 *** 0.004          Ref.   
AT -0.053 *** 0.004    0.001  0.006       
FI 0.072 *** 0.004       -0.002  0.004    
SE 0.1 *** 0.004       0.031 *** 0.004    
DE 0.005  0.004    0.058 *** 0.006       
LU -0.04 *** 0.006    0.008  0.007       
Observations 818168 50464 328750 129536 309418 
Log likelihood -432849 -26584 -166126 -60103 -169704 
pseudo - R2 0.148   0.123   0.142   0.086   0.174   
Country dummies    yes   Yes   yes   yes   
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Table 4: Female activity rate: trends and welfare regimes 
 ALL LIBERAL CONTINENTAL DEMOCRATIC SOUTHERN 
 Coef.  St.Err. Coef.  St.Err. Coef.  St.Err. Coef.  St.Err. Coef.  St.Err. 
Marital status                
Single                
Incouple -0.021  0.022 0.029  0.074 -0.065 * 0.035 0.033  0.034 0.008  0.033 
Separated 0.055 *** 0.007 0.033 * 0.017 0.021  0.018 0.012  0.024 0.091 *** 0.009 
Divorced 0.029 *** 0.005 0.039 *** 0.013 0.006  0.007 -0.020 *** 0.007 0.114 *** 0.008 
Widowed -0.032 *** 0.006 0.022 * 0.013 -0.049 *** 0.010 -0.009  0.013 -0.045 *** 0.008 
Children                
No children                
Children -0.032 *** 0.003 -0.019  0.012 -0.026 *** 0.006 -0.038 *** 0.006 -0.031 *** 0.004 
Childd 0.046 *** 0.017 -0.001  0.068 0.085 *** 0.030 0.146 *** 0.028 0.026  0.023 
child03d -0.120 *** 0.026 -0.313 *** 0.086 -0.186 *** 0.044 -0.381 *** 0.049 -0.038  0.034 
child36d -0.126 *** 0.024 -0.245 *** 0.087 -0.181 *** 0.041 0.001  0.042 -0.104 *** 0.031 
child614d -0.042 ** 0.018 -0.121 * 0.068 -0.040  0.033 -0.017  0.036 -0.058 ** 0.024 
trend*child 0.000  0.001 0.004  0.005 -0.002  0.002 -0.005 ** 0.002 0.000  0.002 
trend*child03 -0.003  0.002 0.006  0.007 -0.002  0.004 0.015 *** 0.003 -0.002  0.003 
trend*child36 0.003  0.002 0.006  0.007 0.007 ** 0.003 -0.001  0.003 0.005 * 0.003 
trend*child614 -0.002  0.001 0.000  0.005 -0.002  0.003 0.003  0.003 0.000  0.002 
Co-habiting Elderly                
no elderly                
old7080 0.031  0.035 -0.184  0.175 0.015  0.087 -0.100  0.111 0.028  0.039 
old80 -0.062  0.044 -0.015  0.246 -0.083  0.119 -0.062  0.191 -0.067  0.046 
trend*old7080 -0.008 *** 0.003 0.002  0.013 -0.011  0.007 -0.003  0.008 -0.006 ** 0.003 
trend*old80 0.004  0.003 -0.004  0.019 0.005  0.009 -0.003  0.014 0.005  0.004 
Education                
Low skilled                
ISCED35 0.074 *** 0.017 0.171 *** 0.065 -0.018  0.032 0.116 *** 0.033 0.124 *** 0.023 
ISCED57 0.129 *** 0.021 0.156 ** 0.073 -0.002  0.038 0.154 *** 0.036 0.223 *** 0.027 
trend*ISCED35 0.006 *** 0.001 0.001  0.006 0.012 *** 0.003 0.000  0.003 0.002  0.002 
trend*ISCED57 0.010 *** 0.002 0.007  0.006 0.019 *** 0.003 0.002  0.003 0.004 ** 0.002 
pISCED03 -0.036  0.025 0.011  0.097 0.022  0.047 0.005  0.046 -0.065 * 0.035 
pISCED35 -0.043 * 0.024 0.039  0.077 0.014  0.039 -0.010  0.041 -0.093 *** 0.036 
pISCED57 -0.029  0.026 0.031  0.080 -0.024  0.042 -0.020  0.045 0.004  0.041 
trend*pISCED03 0.003 * 0.002 0.002  0.008 0.000  0.004 0.005  0.004 0.004 * 0.003 
trend*pISCED35 0.009 *** 0.002 0.004  0.006 0.004  0.003 0.008 *** 0.003 0.011 *** 0.003 
trend*pISCED57 0.006 *** 0.002 0.001  0.006 0.006 * 0.003 0.008 ** 0.004 0.003  0.003 
Age                
25-34                
35-44 0.006  0.022 0.084  0.079 -0.061  0.039 0.125 *** 0.037 0.017  0.028 
45-54 -0.085 *** 0.023 -0.129  0.090 -0.177 *** 0.039 0.125 *** 0.041 -0.050 * 0.031 
55-64 -0.383 *** 0.021 -0.312 *** 0.089 -0.529 *** 0.025 0.010  0.043 -0.291 *** 0.029 
trend*(35-44) 0.005 *** 0.002 -0.003  0.006 0.010 *** 0.003 -0.004  0.003 0.004 * 0.002 
trend*(45-54) 0.008 *** 0.002 0.006  0.007 0.016 *** 0.003 -0.002  0.004 0.005 ** 0.002 
trend*(55-64) 0.011 *** 0.002 0.004  0.007 0.025 *** 0.003 -0.006 * 0.003 0.005 * 0.003 
Macro                
trend 0.001  0.002 0.000  0.007 -0.006  0.004 0.006  0.004 0.005 ** 0.002 
cycle 0.005 *** 0.001 0.002  0.002 0.007 *** 0.001 0.001 ** 0.001 0.004 *** 0.001 
Observations 818168  50464  328750  129536  309418  
Log likelihood -473009.5  -27444.5  -186695.4  -67324.4  -185333.1  
pseudo - R2 0.128   0.117  0.122   0.084  0.132   
Country dummies yes   -  yes   yes   yes   
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Table 5. Description of macro policy and institutional indicators 
Final 
Variable 
Original 
Varable Description Source 
Institutions 
Employment 
Protection 
Legislation 
Composite indicator of employment protection which refers both to 
regulations concerning hiring (e.g. rules favouring disadvantaged 
groups, conditions for using temporary or fixed-term contracts, 
training requirements) and firing (e.g. redundancy procedures, 
mandated prenotification periods and severance payments, special 
requirements for collective dismissals and short-time work 
schemes). 
OECD, 
various 
years 
Passive 
Labour 
Market 
Policies 
Sum of national expenditures on active labour market policies (in 
percentage of national GDP), including: Out-of-work income 
maintenance and support, Early retirement. 
OECD, 
various 
years 
Active 
Labour 
Market 
Policies 
Sum of national expenditures on active labour market policies (in 
percentage of national GDP), including: Training, Job Rotation 
and Job Sharing, Employment incentives, Supported employment 
and rehabilitation, Direct job creation, Start-up incentives.  
OECD, 
various 
years 
Policies 
Elderly 
Subsidies 
Sum of national transfers to the elderly population (per head at 
constant prices (2000) and constant PPPs (2000), in US dollars), 
weighted by the percentage of old-age population (over 70 years 
old) within the country. This set of policies includes: Old age cash 
and in kind benefits, Residential care or Home-help services. 
OECD, 
various 
years 
Family 
Susidies 
Sum of national expenditures on allowances and other type of 
monthly transfers to the households (per family at constant prices 
(2000) and constant PPPs(2000), in US dollars). We consider a 
weighted sum of monthly family allowances for the first, second, 
and third child in national currency, with weights equal to the 
average number of children a woman would have if she lived to the 
end of her childbearing years (conventionally considered to be 15-
44 but sometimes 15-49) and bore children at the prevailing rate 
for each age during that period. Value of tax and benefit transfers 
of one-earner-two-parent two-child families are considered. The 
value was calculated by subtracting the disposable income (after 
taxes and transfers) of a one-earner-two-parent-two-child family 
from that of a comparable childless single earner.  
Anne H. 
Gauthier, 
2011 
Paternal 
Leave 
Composite indicator of national expenditures on maternity, 
parental, and child care leave schemes. It is a weighted sum of the 
total number of weeks of maternity, parental and child-care leave, 
with weights equal to the cash benefits paid during the leave as a 
percent of female wages in manufacturing. 
Anne H. 
Gauthier, 
2011 
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Table 6. Principal Component Analysis: rotated factor loadings 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Uniqueness 
Elderly Subsidies 0.2570  0.9339 
Parental Leave 0.8251  0.3192 
Family Subsidies 0.8399  0.2946 
Employment Protection 
Legislation 
 -0.1499 0.9775 
Passive Labour Market Policies  0.9119 0.1684 
Active Labour Market Policies  0.9215 0.1509 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 The variance of each original variable not captured by the factor is an error term called a uniqueness. Hence, the greater 
‘uniqueness’ the lower the relevance of the variable in the resulting factor. 
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Table 7: Two-Level probit regression: the impact policy & institutions by age  
 ALL 25-34 34-45 44-55 
 Coef.  St.Err. Coef.  St.Err. Coef.  St.Err. Coef.  St.Err. 
                 
INST -0.006   0.014 -0.031  0.037 0.008   0.015 0.024   0.015 
POL 0.003   0.024 -0.009   0.045 0.013   0.026 0.006   0.020 
INST  child06 0.015 *** 0.001 0.040 *** 0.002 0.002   0.002 0.008   0.006 
POL  child06 0.000   0.001 0.006 *** 0.002 0.003   0.002 0.008   0.006 
INST old70 -0.020 *** 0.003 -0.013 ** 0.006 -0.019 *** 0.005 -0.023 *** 0.005 
POL  old70 -0.008 ** 0.003 -0.008   0.007 0.004   0.006 -0.026 *** 0.005 
VPC_overall 0.056   0.199   0.063   0.042     
VPC_level 2 0.426   0.675   0.439   0.439     
 
 
Table 8: Two-Level probit regression: the impact policy & institutions by education  
 ISCED_03 ISCED_35 ISCED_57 
 Coef.  St.Err. Coef.  St.Err. Coef.  St.Err. 
          
INST 0.004  0.028 -0.012  0.013 -0.015 *** 0.014 
POL -0.021  0.041 -0.001  0.024 -0.010  0.020 
INST  child06 0.012 *** 0.003 0.014 *** 0.002 0.025 *** 0.002 
POL  child06 0.001  0.002 0.004 ** 0.002 0.011 *** 0.002 
INST old70 -0.041 *** 0.006 -0.020 *** 0.006 -0.001  0.006 
POL  old70 -0.020 *** 0.006 -0.001  0.006 0.002  0.006 
VPC_overall 0.121   0.048   0.058   
VPC_level 2 0.572   0.419   0.453   
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Table 9: Two-Level probit regression flexicurity: the impact of flexicurity by age  
  
 
ALL 25-34 35-44 45-54 
 Coef.  St.Err. Coef.  St.Err. Coef.  St.Err. Coef. St.Err. 
FLEX -0.248 ** 0.118 -0.197  0.139 -0.131  0.094 -0.057 0.072 
SEC -0.209 * 0.116 -0.168 * 0.098 -0.132  0.097 -0.044 0.07 
FLEX x SEC 0.118 * 0.061 0.095 * 0.05 0.084 * 0.044 0.029 0.033 
FLEX x child06 -0.057 *** 0.003 -0.056 *** 0.004 -0.069 *** 0.004 -0.044 0.011 
SEC x child06 -0.022 *** 0.004 0.021 *** 0.006 -0.067 *** 0.007 -0.022 0.019 
FLEX x SEC x child06 0.025 *** 0.002 0.019 *** 0.003 0.038 *** 0.003 0.016 0.009 
FLEX x old70 -0.022 *** 0.005 -0.027 ** 0.011 -0.033 *** 0.009 -0.01 0.008 
SEC x old70 -0.031 *** 0.008 -0.042 *** 0.016 -0.036 *** 0.013 -0.017 0.012 
FLEX x SEC x old70 0.006  0.005 0.022 ** 0.01 0.01  0.008 -0.007 0.007 
VPC_overall 0.224   0.257   0.308   0.333  
VPC_level 2 0.264   0.287   0.385   0.589  
 
 
 
Table 10: Two-Level probit regression flexicurity: the impact of flexicirity by education  
  
 
ISCED 0-2 ISCED 3-5 ISCED 5-7 
 Coef.  St.Err. Coef.  St.Err. Coef.  St.Err. 
          
FLEX -0.136  0.149 -0.002  0.064 -0.014  0.046 
SEC -0.242 * 0.149 0.022  0.063 -0.007  0.049 
FLEX x SEC 0.133 *** 0.054 0.026  0.032 0.022  0.025 
FLEX x child06 -0.067 *** 0.005 -0.084 *** 0.005 -0.052 *** 0.004 
SEC x child06 -0.010  0.008 -0.048 *** 0.006 0.014 ** 0.006 
FLEX x SEC x child06 0.019 *** 0.004 0.038 *** 0.003 0.006 * 0.003 
FLEX x old70 -0.002  0.009 -0.048 *** 0.010 -0.013  0.009 
SEC x old70 -0.013  0.013 -0.078 *** 0.014 -0.009  0.014 
FLEX x SEC x old70 0.017 ** 0.008 0.035 *** 0.008 0.005  0.009 
VPC_overall 0.365   0.211   0.211   
VPC_level 2 0.418   0.322   0.323   
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Table 11: INST and POL contribution to female 
participation 
 
  EU15 
  
  
activity 
rate 
predicted 
by INST 
and POL 
predicted 
by other 
observables 
 INST and 
POL 
contribution 
(%) 
1995 0.0053 0.0009 0.0007 0.170 
1996 0.0165 0.0005 0.0087 0.030 
1997 0.0234 0.0011 0.0183 0.047 
1998 0.0318 0.0025 0.0123 0.079 
1999 0.0439 0.0027 0.0130 0.062 
2000 0.0515 0.0037 0.0097 0.072 
2004 0.0813 0.0021 0.0558 0.026 
2005 0.0888 0.0046 0.0605 0.052 
2006 0.0970 0.0055 0.0626 0.057 
2007 0.1023 0.0070 0.0640 0.068 
2008 0.1073 0.0075 0.0614 0.070 
2009 0.1130 0.0026 0.0557 0.023 
mean       0.063 
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Table 12: INST and POL contribution to female participation by welfare regime 
  
  
activity 
rate 
predicted 
by INST 
and POL 
predicted 
by other 
observables 
INST and 
POL 
contribution 
(%) 
  
activity 
rate 
predicted 
by INST 
and POL 
predicted 
by other 
observables 
INST and 
POL 
contribution 
(%) 
 
Continental Social Democratic 
1995 0.0059 0.0008 -0.0036 0.136 -0.001 0.0007 -0.0064 -0.700 
1996 0.0186 0.0001 -0.0029 0.005 -0.001 -0.0002 -0.0198 0.200 
1997 0.0307 0.0007 -0.0011 0.023 -0.0083 0.0014 -0.0192 -0.169 
1998 0.0407 0.0032 -0.025 0.079 -0.0067 0.0021 -0.0184 -0.313 
1999 0.0566 0.004 -0.0263 0.071 -0.0007 0.0002 -0.0175 -0.271 
2000 0.0651 0.0051 -0.031 0.078 -0.0003 0.00017 -0.015 -0.567 
2004 0.0996 -0.0003 0.0279 -0.003 0.0003 0.00023 0.0016 0.767 
2005 0.109 0.0058 0.0429 0.053 0.0053 0.0045 0.0002 0.849 
2006 0.1181 0.0064 0.0439 0.054 0.0083 0.0053 0.0009 0.639 
2007 0.126 0.0074 0.0454 0.059 0.0117 0.0075 -0.0008 0.641 
2008 0.1281 0.0098 0.0413 0.077 0.018 0.0079 -0.0046 0.439 
2009 0.1357 0.0027 0.0319 0.020 0.016 0.0031 -0.0091 0.194 
mean 
   
0.054 
   
0.142 
  Liberal  Southern  
1995 0.002 -0.0002 0.0017 -0.100 0.0097 0.0009 0.0031 0.093 
1996 0.007 0.0002 0.0038 0.029 0.0283 0.0014 0.004 0.049 
1997 0.011 0.0003 0.0059 0.027 0.0375 0.002 0.0057 0.053 
1998 0.013 0.0006 0.0534 0.046 0.0498 0.0025 0.0082 0.050 
1999 0.021 0.0009 0.0585 0.043 0.0607 0.0019 0.01 0.031 
2000 0.023 0.0022 0.0395 0.096 0.0735 0.0018 0.0125 0.024 
2004   
  
  0.1235 0.0013 0.0499 0.011 
2005 0.034 0.004 0.0739 0.118 0.1298 0.002 0.0514 0.015 
2006 0.037 0.0038 0.0708 0.103 0.1415 0.0032 0.0547 0.023 
2007 0.037 0.004 0.0774 0.108 0.145 0.0049 0.0563 0.034 
2008 0.043 0.0035 0.0764 0.081 0.1537 0.0038 0.0552 0.025 
2009 
   
  0.1622 -0.0006 0.0562 -0.004 
mean       0.055       0.034 
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Table 13: INST and POL contribution to female participation by age groups 
  25-34 35-44 45-54 
  
 
activity 
rate 
predicted 
by INST 
and POL 
predicted 
by other 
observables 
 INST and 
POL 
contribution 
(%) 
  
activity 
rate 
predicted 
by INST 
and POL 
predicted 
by other 
observables 
 INST and 
POL 
contribution 
(%) 
  
activity 
rate 
predicted 
by INST 
and POL 
predicted 
by other 
observables 
 INST and 
POL 
contribution 
(%) 
1995 0.0160 0.0073 -0.0028 0.456 0.0346 0.0003 -0.0030 0.009 0.0556 -0.0031 0.0089 -0.056 
1996 0.0290 0.0032 -0.0022 0.110 0.0473 0.0013 0.0026 0.027 0.0609 0.0012 0.0276 0.020 
1997 0.0342 0.0043 -0.0074 0.126 0.0549 0.0022 0.0098 0.040 0.0728 0.0024 0.0535 0.033 
1998 0.0380 0.0088 -0.0172 0.232 0.0580 0.0045 0.0003 0.078 0.0876 0.0007 0.0536 0.008 
1999 0.0509 0.0108 -0.0209 0.212 0.0713 0.0048 -0.0021 0.067 0.1049 0.0004 0.0629 0.004 
2000 0.0598 0.0191 -0.0331 0.319 0.0796 0.0045 -0.0063 0.057 0.1121 -0.0040 0.0675 -0.036 
2004 0.0741 0.0159 0.0314 0.215 0.1044 0.0006 0.0523 0.006 0.1614 -0.0031 0.1078 -0.019 
2005 0.0769 0.0195 0.0019 0.254 0.1110 0.0068 0.0509 0.061 0.1772 -0.0015 0.1415 -0.008 
2006 0.0842 0.0229 -0.0041 0.272 0.1194 0.0077 0.0518 0.064 0.1871 -0.0033 0.1536 -0.018 
2007 0.0856 0.0289 -0.0098 0.338 0.1257 0.0094 0.0523 0.075 0.1962 -0.0060 0.1638 -0.031 
2008 0.0887 0.0291 -0.0176 0.328 0.1285 0.0104 0.0493 0.081 0.2061 -0.0057 0.1657 -0.028 
2009 0.0949 0.0087 -0.0207 0.092 0.1359 0.0038 0.0423 0.028 0.2107 0.0005 0.1598 0.002 
mean       0.246       0.049       -0.011 
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Table 14: INST and POL contribution to female participation by education groups 
  isced_02 isced_35 isced_67 
  
 
activity 
rate 
predicted 
by INST 
and POL 
predicted 
by other 
observables 
 INST and 
POL 
contribution 
(%) 
  
activity 
rate 
predicted 
by INST 
and POL 
predicted 
by other 
observables 
 INST and 
POL 
contribution 
(%) 
  
activity 
rate 
predicted 
by INST 
and POL 
predicted 
by other 
observables 
 INST and 
POL 
contribution 
(%) 
1995 0.0485 -0.0017 -0.0002 -0.035 0.0163 0.0023 -0.0001 0.141 0.0117 0.0054 -0.0038 0.462 
1996 0.0401 -0.0021 0.0034 -0.052 0.0301 0.0005 0.0055 0.017 0.0163 -0.0028 -0.0006 -0.172 
1997 0.0467 -0.0034 0.0106 -0.073 0.0297 0.0005 0.0165 0.017 0.0191 -0.0015 0.0021 -0.079 
1998 0.0694 -0.0131 0.0046 -0.189 0.0513 0.0034 0.0152 0.066 0.0339 0.0104 -0.0164 0.307 
1999 0.0608 -0.0115 0.0044 -0.189 0.0491 0.0035 0.0154 0.071 0.0301 0.0119 -0.0199 0.395 
2000 0.0677 -0.0143 0.0034 -0.211 0.0574 0.0067 0.0154 0.117 0.0293 0.02 -0.0226 0.683 
2004 0.0825 -0.0061 0.0435 -0.074 0.0656 0.0063 0.0383 0.096 0.0336 0.0157 -0.0012 0.467 
2005 0.0866 -0.0115 0.0387 -0.133 0.0697 0.0061 0.0254 0.088 0.0361 0.0177 -0.0169 0.490 
2006 0.0923 -0.0132 0.04 -0.143 0.0791 0.0071 0.0276 0.090 0.0388 0.0207 -0.0173 0.534 
2007 0.1008 -0.0168 0.0402 -0.167 0.0831 0.0093 0.0254 0.112 0.0405 0.0254 -0.0161 0.627 
2008 0.1017 -0.0164 0.0388 -0.161 0.0873 0.0094 0.0198 0.108 0.0409 0.0257 -0.0241 0.628 
2009 0.0998 -0.0066 0.0345 -0.066 0.0913 0.0062 0.0095 0.068 0.044 0.0132 -0.0323 0.300 
mean       -0.124       0.082       0.387 
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Figure 1. Macro data trends in Europe: Activity rate by gender, 1994-2009 
 
Source: OECD Labour Market Statistics retrieved from http://stats.oecd.org/. 
 
Figure 2. Macro data trends in Europe: Unemployment rate by gender, 1994-2009  
 
Source: OECD Labour Market Statistics retrieved from http://stats.oecd.org/. 
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Figure 3. Micro-based gender gap index in activity rates, 1994-2009 
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Source: Own elaborations from ECHP and EUSILC databases. 
 
 
Figure 4. Micro-based gender gap index in unemployment rates, 1994-2009 
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Source: Own elaborations from ECHP and EUSILC databases. 
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Figure 5: The flexicurity dimensions 
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Source: Own elaborations from OECD institutions and SOCX databases 
 
 
